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Yale Program on Financial Stability Survey  
June 23, 2021 
 
Abstract 
Dealing with high levels of nonperforming assets (NPAs) on bank balance sheets is one of the 
most challenging aspects of financial crisis management. High levels of NPAs can interfere 
with both bank profitability and general economic growth by increasing uncertainty about 
bank solvency and therefore funding costs, tying up resources and attention, and inhibiting 
new lending. One potential solution to the NPA problem is a centralized, government-driven 
effort to remove these assets from troubled institutions and then manage and sell them. 
Though such broad-based asset management (BBAM) programs existed even earlier in 
history, they appear to have become more common beginning in the 1980s and 1990s with 
the shift toward market-based financial systems in Africa, South America, and the former 
Soviet bloc, as well as with the advent of the Asian Financial Crisis. They were also a feature 
of the response to the Global Financial Crisis. While BBAM programs have been widely used, 
whether or not such a program makes sense to address a given situation is highly context-
specific, and special attention must be paid to the incentives of those involved. Important 
considerations include the political and legal context in which the program will operate, the 
nature and extent of the NPAs to be managed, and the availability of the necessary expertise. 
There is also evidence to suggest that BBAM programs are ineffective in isolation and must 
be coupled with recapitalization.  
Keywords: asset management companies, nonperforming loans, nonperforming assets 
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This survey is an analysis of important considerations for policymakers seeking to establish 
a broad-based asset management (BBAM) program. It is based on insights derived from case 
studies of 29 specific BBAM programs the Yale Program on Financial Stability has completed 
and from the existing literature on the topic. While this survey can help inform a decision 
about whether or not to establish a BBAM program, it is not intended to be definitive on this 
question. Instead, the survey is intended primarily to assist policymakers who have already 
made that decision in designing the most effective program possible.  
In analyzing the programs that are the focus of this survey, we used a color-coded system to 
highlight certain particularly noteworthy design features. Our color-coding system is as 
follows: 
Color Meaning 
BLUE – INTERESTING A design feature that is interesting and that 
policymakers may want to consider. 
Typically, this determination is based on the 
observation that the design feature involves 
a unique and potentially promising way of 
addressing a challenge common to this type 
of program that may not be obvious. Less 
commonly, there will be empirical evidence 
or a widely held consensus that the design 
feature was effective in this context, in 
which case we will describe that evidence or 
consensus.  
YELLOW – CAUTION INDICATED A design feature that policymakers should 
exercise caution in considering. Typically, 
this determination is based on the 
observation that the designers of the 
feature later made significant changes to the 
feature with the intention of improving the 
functioning of the program. Less commonly, 
there will be empirical evidence or a widely 
held consensus that the design feature was 
ineffective in this context, in which case we 
will describe that evidence or consensus.  
FOOTNOTE IN ITALICS Where the reason that a given design 
feature has been highlighted is not apparent 
from the text, it is accompanied by a 
footnote that explains why we chose to 
highlight it as we did. Where necessary, 
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footnotes will also be used to identify any 
caveats or additional considerations that 
should be kept in mind when thinking about 
the feature. These footnotes are italicized to 
identify them for the reader. 
 
This highlighting is not intended to be dispositive. The fact that a design feature is not 
highlighted or is highlighted yellow does not mean that it should not be considered or that it 
will never be effective under any circumstances. Similarly, the fact that a design feature is 
not highlighted or is highlighted blue does not mean that it should always be considered or 
will be effective under all circumstances. The highlighting is our subjective attempt to guide 
readers towards certain design features that (1) may not be obvious but are worth 
considering or (2) require caution in considering.  Readers must always consider these 
features while keeping in mind the contents of the survey as a whole and their own particular 
context and objectives.  
I. Overview 
The question of what to do with the nonperforming assets (NPAs)6 that often plague bank 
balance sheets during banking crises may be “one of the most critical and complex aspects 
of financial sector crisis management” (Ingves, Seelig, and He 2004). High levels of NPAs 
increase uncertainty about bank solvency and bank funding costs, tie up resources, and 
constrain new lending (Fell et al. 2017). They can also interfere with the transmission of 
monetary policy (Fell et al. 2017). Not surprisingly then, evidence has shown that elevated 
NPA percentages slow economic growth (Balgova, Nies, and Plekhanov 2016).  
Faced with the need to ensure the effective management and disposition of NPAs, 
policymakers have frequently determined that a centralized, government-driven approach 
to dealing with such assets is preferable to any decentralized alternatives. A key question is 
whether the centralized program will be able to achieve the improved outcomes necessary 
to justify the cost and effort (which are often quite significant). With that in mind, 
governments typically choose a centralized approach when (1) their troubled-asset problem 
is systemic, rather than limited to one or two banks; (2) their troubled assets are focused on 
sectors—particularly commercial real estate and large corporate loans—in which a 
centralized program could have a competitive advantage due to bargaining power, 
economies of scale, or the homogeneity of the assets; and (3) they have or believe they will 
be able to acquire the necessary expertise to manage and dispose of those assets.  
 
6 This survey uses the term “nonperforming assets” instead of “nonperforming loans” to reflect the fact that 
while the assets acquired by BBAM programs were typically loans, other types of assets were sometimes 
involved. See Eligible Assets under Key Design Decisions for additional discussion.  
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Given the various difficulties presented by high levels of NPAs, governments’ objectives in 
pursuing a centralized approach to removing NPAs can vary. The specific objectives being 
sought by a particular effort will shape how it should be designed. Key objectives that often 
underlie governments’ removal of NPAs from bank balance sheets include: 
1. Reducing uncertainty about the quality of banks’ balance sheets and protecting them 
from further losses 
2. Allowing banks to focus on their core business rather than the management of NPAs 
3. Cleaning up particular sectors of the economy that have resulted in NPAs 
4. Minimizing the ultimate cost to taxpayers of the NPAs 
5. Managing the political and communication challenges posed by the NPAs and efforts 
to address them.     
While there are examples of governments establishing vehicles to remove problematic 
assets from institutions’ balance sheets even earlier in history,7 the practice appears to have 
become more common beginning in the 1980s and 1990s. During this timeframe, countries 
in Africa, South America, and the former Soviet bloc that were transitioning to more market-
based banking systems had to confront large stocks of legacy NPAs stemming from prior 
periods of government-directed lending, and they founded asset management programs in 
response. The Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 also gave rise to several such programs. 
Similarly, these programs were often a feature of countries’ responses to the Global Financial 
Crisis.  
This survey is limited to the examination of broad-based asset management (BBAM) 
programs and therefore excludes interventions such as the 2008 Maiden Lane vehicles in the 
United States intended to address the problematic assets of a specific institution.8 Table 1 
shows a list of the BBAM programs studied for the purposes of this survey. This list includes 
programs that acquired assets solely from banks that remained in operation (open-bank-
only programs), programs that acquired assets solely from failed banks being resolved 
(closed-bank-only programs), and programs that acquired assets from both types of banks. 
The considerations associated with an open-bank-only program are not identical to those 
associated with a closed-bank-only program, particularly in terms of acquisition. However, 
these different types of programs have enough in common to warrant being examined 
together.  
 
7 For a data set of crisis interventions (including broad-based asset management programs) dating back to the 
14th century, see Metrick and Schmelzing (working paper). 
8 Included in the BBAM programs studied in this survey are programs such as Sweden’s Securum/Retriva and 
China’s 1999 AMCs, in which policymakers initially established vehicles to address the problematic assets of 
particular institutions on a one-to-one basis, before such vehicles were ultimately consolidated or otherwise 
assumed responsibility for a broader array of financial institutions.  
44
The Journal of Financial Crises Vol. 3 Iss. 2
 
 
Table 1: List of BBAM Programs Studied 
 
 
Source: Author analysis. 
As the launch dates in Table 1 suggest, there were distinct periods of BBAM program usage 
(Asian Financial Crisis, Global Financial Crisis, etc.). Programs developed in later periods of 
usage could and often did incorporate lessons learned from previous efforts. Policymakers 
have often cited Sweden’s Securum/Retriva and the United States’ Resolution Trust 
Corporation (RTC) as models for their own efforts. 
Given the critical nature of NPA problems, the fact that BBAM programs were not even more 
widespread merits discussion. Whether or not it makes sense to address a given situation 
with a BBAM program is highly context specific. Certainly there are considerations that could 
weigh in favor of alternate approaches like keeping NPAs with the banks who originated 
them for resolution or using asset management companies (AMCs) specific to each 
institution. Such decentralized AMCs were more common than the centralized AMCs 
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characteristic of most BBAM programs in the Global Financial Crisis (Dobler, Moretti, and 
Piris 2020). Table 2 summarizes some of the main factors to be considered in determining 
whether to employ a BBAM program over such alternatives. 
Table 2: Factors to Weigh in Considering a BBAM Program 
 
 
Sources: Baudino and Yun 2017; Cas and Peresa 2016; Cerruti and Neyens 2016; EC 2018; Fell 
et al. 2017; Ingves, Seelig, and He 2004; Klingebiel 2000; Rose 2005.  
In considering these factors, careful attention must be paid to the incentives of all parties 
that would be involved in a BBAM program and how they compare with the incentives that 
would exist absent the program—the incentives of the banks, bank employees, program 
employees, and debtors. For example, the incentives of BBAM program employees (who, 
among other considerations, would typically be out of a job following the disposal of the 
acquired NPAs) are different from those of bank employees should NPAs remain with banks.  
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II. Key Design Decisions 
Part of a Package  
As outlined in the Background section, high levels of NPAs can have significant negative 
consequences for financial institutions. It is thus not surprising that the BBAM programs 
studied were typically not introduced in isolation, but rather alongside other measures 
intended to address some of the consequences that can result from NPAs including the loss 
of liquidity and the erosion of capital. Interventions such as emergency lending facilities, 
asset guarantees, liability guarantees, corporate restructuring initiatives, recapitalizations, 
banking sector restructuring, and bank regulatory reform are common counterparts to 
BBAM initiatives. Table 3 below shows which of the programs studied were combined with 
these other interventions. 
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 Table 3: Program Packages 
 
Source: Author analysis. 
The decision about what to include in the package follows directly from the diagnosis of the 
problem, particularly the extent and type of NPAs. A country with a relatively small NPA 
problem focused on commercial real estate might require only a voluntary BBAM program, 
tied to voluntary recapitalization. A country with a larger NPA problem focused on corporate 
loans might also need a major corporate restructuring initiative. A country whose banking 
troubles are focused on a small number of systemically important institutions might be 
better served by company-specific rescue plans and a BBAM program only for certain types 
of commonly held assets, which may lend themselves to economies of scale. 
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Of the potential measures that could join BBAM programs as part of a broader bank support 
package, recapitalization is often the single most important counterpart. Banks with high 
levels of NPAs, almost by definition, face capital shortfalls. The exact need for recapitalization 
is closely tied to a BBAM program’s approach to pricing. As discussed in more detail in the 
section on Pricing, policymakers must decide whether to acquire NPAs at book value or for 
some lower amount, such as real economic value or market price. The former approach 
protects transferring institutions from losses on the sale of NPAs and shifts those losses to 
the BBAM program. This acts as a recapitalization of the transferring institutions and can 
eliminate the need for a separate capital injection program (but can also have significant 
drawbacks as will be discussed in the Pricing section).  
Acquiring assets for some lower amount, by contrast, imposes losses on the transferring 
institutions. Depending on the size of those losses, an institution’s capital may become so 
eroded as to require recapitalization. The failure to pair a BBAM program with a 
recapitalization measure under these circumstances would likely prevent policymakers 
from achieving their desired outcomes. As will be discussed in more detail in the Evaluation 
section, an analysis of asset segregation efforts in Europe from 2000 to 2016 suggests that 
the removal of NPAs without recapitalization does not improve loan growth or reduce future 
NPA levels. The study finds that the reverse is also true—that recapitalization without 
removal of NPAs is ineffective (Brei et al. 2020). The BBAM programs studied here likewise 
provide evidence of a need to combine NPA removal with recapitalization. Hungary’s Loan 
Consolidation Program (LCPs), launched in 1992, failed to sufficiently reduce NPA levels by 
itself, resulting in the introduction of a recapitalization measure in 1993–1994. Kazakhstan’s 
Rehabilitation Bank similarly began acquiring NPAs without capital injections. The country’s 
largest banks remained under significant financial stress and ultimately had to be rescued.  
The positive interplay between BBAM programs and recapitalization measures may mean 
that eligibility for one should be contingent on participation in the other. Several of the 
programs studied adopted this approach. For Mexico’s Fondo Bancario de Protección al 
Ahorro (FOBRAPROA), recapitalization was not only required for participation in the BBAM 
program, but it also determined the amount of NPAs to be acquired from a given 
institution—approximately two times the amount of new capital it received.9 
For efforts combining BBAM programs with other measures such as recapitalizations, the 
next important consideration is whether the initiatives should be combined under a single 
entity/umbrella or split up among different entities/umbrellas, each with a singular focus. 
The latter approach appears to have been more common among the programs studied. 
Malaysia, for example, established Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Berhad (Danaharta) to 
remove NPAs from the system and Danamodal Nasional Berhad to recapitalize banks. As will 
be discussed in Mandates below, a combined approach may give rise to concerns about 
conflicting mandates and a loss of focus.  
 
9 In the case of FOBAPROA, most of this capital was provided by private sources with government 
encouragement rather than coming in the form of a direct recapitalization by the state. 
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Legal Authority  
The removal of troubled assets from the balance sheets of financial institutions is not 
typically something that is within the ongoing mandates of central banks or other 
governmental bodies. Thus, the majority of the programs studied required new laws in order 
to be established. One unique exception to this general approach was Hungary’s Magyar 
Reorganizációs és Követeléskezelö (MARK), which the Hungarian central bank created 
pursuant to its macroprudential policy mandate.10 In Thailand, policymakers made use of a 
royal decree to expedite establishment of the Thai Asset Management Company (TAMC). 
Uruguay’s central bank appears to have relied on unclear legal authority to launch the 
Nonperforming Portfolio Purchase Scheme (NPPS) initially before it was ultimately ratified 
through new legislation. This resulted in several investigations by Parliament, the 
comptroller, and the court system. The typical need to pass new legislation authorizing 
BBAM programs and the added time and difficulty this can involve especially in crisis 
conditions may mean that it is worth considering proactively establishing the legal basis for 
programs to be created under certain circumstances. This could be done before the next 
crisis hits.  
An additional consideration for BBAM programs established in the European Union (EU) has 
been the need to comply with European Commission (EC) rules on State aid.11 These rules 
significantly influenced program design, especially with respect to the price to be paid for 
NPAs, as discussed in greater detail in the Pricing section.  
Special Powers 
As noted in the Overview, the legal context in which a BBAM program operates significantly 
influences its likelihood for success. An evaluation of the robustness of its legal framework 
is an important step for any country contemplating a BBAM, with particular attention to 
whether insolvency, bankruptcy, and foreclosure laws are strong enough to allow creditors 
to efficiently pursue recoveries. Sometimes this evaluation will result in the conclusion that 
the existing framework is sufficient, as was the case with Sweden’s Securum/Retriva, where 
policymakers explicitly determined that special powers were unnecessary. However, 
oftentimes countries introducing BBAM programs lacked effective legal frameworks for 
dealing with NPAs. This is often the case for emerging markets and developing economies. It 
appears to have been particularly true for countries whose BBAM programs were introduced 
as part of making the shift toward market-based financial systems. One way in which 
policymakers sought to overcome deficiencies in their existing frameworks was to equip 
BBAM programs with special powers. BBAM programs can generally be granted enhanced 
legal authority more quickly than a country can completely rework its existing legal 
 
10 The use of an existing authority such as a macroprudential policy mandate to establish a BBAM program may 
allow for more rapid introduction of a program during a crisis in which speed is often of the essence, but should 
be weighed against other potential considerations such as the need for the political legitimacy that can result 
from specific legislative authorization of a program. 
11 The legal requirements for BBAM programs adopted in the EU have continued to evolve since the time of the 
programs studied in this survey with the introduction of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive and the 
Single Resolution Mechanism Regulation. For a complete discussion of these requirements, see EC 2018. 
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framework, which may be one reason to consider adopting a program. The need to provide 
special powers might also weigh in favor of a BBAM program that is fully publicly owned.  
Table 4 provides an overview of the various special powers included in the programs 
studied. As Table 4 illustrates, special powers were typically aimed at addressing 
deficiencies associated with inefficient or nonexistent legal processes for dealing with 
delinquent debtors. Often this became most important in the context of corporate debt. The 
problem of politically connected debtors was also a special problem in many cases. 
Sometimes deficiencies requiring special powers did not reveal themselves until after the 
BBAM programs were already underway, making program amendments necessary. Burkina 
Faso’s Bureau de Recouvrement des créances du Burkina (BRCB) acquired enhanced powers 
to recover debt two years into its operations. Despite an initial grant of some special powers, 
Nigeria’s Asset Management Corporation of Nigeria (AMCON) required enhancements to its 
initial powers as time went on, including the ability to seize any debtor assets and the right 
to access debtors’ financial information.  
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 Table 4: Summary of Special Powers 
 
 
Source: Author analysis. 
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The efficacy of these special powers appears to be mixed. The World Bank has credited 
Tanzania’s special tribunal and its simplified procedures and exclusive jurisdiction with 
having contributed to the success of the Loan and Advances Realization Trust (LART) (World 
Bank 2001). This success occurred despite the fact that LART dealt primarily with loans to 
state-controlled businesses, which, as discussed in Eligible Assets, can be a challenging asset 
class to address via a BBAM program. In Malaysia, Danaharta’s special legal authority 
enabled it to reduce the time needed to restructure loans from 14 to 16 months to two to 
three months. However, special powers can only work if people are willing and able to use 
them, which was not always the case. Indonesia’s Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency 
(IBRA) possessed powerful enforcement mechanisms but was (1) generally unwilling to go 
after politically connected debtors and (2) often prevented from utilizing such mechanisms 
by Indonesian courts opposed to their use. Mongolia established a special tribunal as part of 
the Mongolian Asset Realization Agency (MARA), but its usefulness was limited by an 
inexperienced judiciary. Evaluations of Ghana’s Nonperforming Asset Recovery Trust 
(NPART) are split on the effectiveness of its special tribunal, with some arguing that it helped 
mitigate the negative impact of a weak legal framework (World Bank 1997) and others 
arguing that it was too slow and debtor friendly (Klingebiel 2000). Additionally, special 
powers may not be enough to overcome underlying NPAs that are of especially poor quality. 
Burkina Faso’s BRCB recovered only 10% of the value of the assets it acquired, 
notwithstanding what the International Monetary Fund (IMF) characterized as its powerful 
tools. Special powers can also be the source for political opposition. This was the case with 
Thailand’s TAMC, whose special powers were criticized by opponents as being excessive. 
Perhaps to avoid such concerns, Malaysia’s Danaharta had an oversight committee charged 
with making sure that special powers were not abused.  
Mandate 
The common mandate that all BBAM programs share is the removal of assets from the 
balance sheets of troubled financial institutions to incentivize new capital and allow banks 
to lend. In every program studied, the government was seeking to clean up banks’ balance 
sheets or simply taking over the assets of banks already in liquidation. However, BBAM 
programs often differ in what they are expected to do with those assets once they take them 
over. Broadly speaking, policymakers generally task BBAM programs with either rapid 
disposal of acquired NPAs or the more active management of such NPAs via restructuring. 
Considerations guiding this choice can include the minimization of taxpayer losses, the 
maximization of NPA value, the avoidance of further market disruption via fire sales, and the 
creation of new financial products.  
Governments also often give BBAM programs additional mandates. Mongolia’s MARA, for 
example, sought to normalize the enforcement of contractual obligations as the country 
entered into its post-Soviet future. However, the inclusion of additional mandates beyond 
the main focus of a BBAM program creates the risk of conflicts or distractions. In the United 
States, Congress charged the RTC with maximizing the return on asset disposition efforts but 
also gave it additional mandates, including the promotion of affordable housing and the 
protection of local real estate markets. Some observers believe these conflicting mandates 
reduced RTC’s effectiveness, given that, for example, reserving real estate assets for low-
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income buyers could increase RTC’s costs while concern for local real estate markets might 
delay sales (FDIC 1998).  
Table 5 summarizes the various mandates for the programs studied. 
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Table 5: Mandates 
 
 
Source: Author analysis.  
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As noted in the Part of a Package section, one key consideration is whether a BBAM program 
will be combined under the same entity/umbrella with other interventions such as 
recapitalization. This too can result in conflicting mandates. Jamaica’s Financial Sector 
Adjustment Company (FINSAC) was responsible for all aspects of the country’s 
comprehensive effort to stabilize its banking system, including bank restructuring and 
recapitalization. Critics maintain that this complicated FINSAC’s operations (Escobar et al. 
1999). In Slovenia, policymakers initially planned to task the Bank Asset Management 
Company (BAMC) with both recapitalization and the acquisition of NPAs. The Ministry of 
Finance subsequently decided that the government would undertake recapitalization 
directly, allowing BAMC to concentrate on NPAs. 
An additional mandate-related consideration in some cases was whether or not the BBAM 
program should be responsible for handling NPAs associated with particular, politically 
powerful debtors. One risk of having a BBAM program handle such NPAs is that the program 
could become a bailout for well-connected debtors or at least be perceived as such. As a 
distinct subcomponent of its overall operations, South Korea’s Korea Asset Management 
Corporation (KAMCO) acquired the debt of the failed Daewoo Group, at the time one of the 
country’s largest and most connected conglomerates. Critics have argued that KAMCO’s 
purchase of Daewoo debt was politically motivated and contributed to the program’s 
underperformance when the debt proved difficult to resolve (He 2004). In contrast, 
policymakers excluded the politically sensitive Rumasa conglomerate from the asset 
management activities of Spain’s Deposit Guarantee Fund (DGF), arguing that including it 
would go beyond the scope of the Fund’s mission. This decision has been widely praised by 
international observers (Sheng 1996).  
Communication 
In announcing the establishment of a BBAM program, policymakers face a number of 
potential risks related to how the program will be perceived. Acknowledging the existence 
of a significant NPA problem could worsen panic in the financial system. Rightly or wrongly, 
the program may be seen by some as a bailout for banks (as was the case with Ireland’s 
National Asset Management Agency [NAMA]) or politically connected debtors (as was the 
case with Indonesia’s IBRA). These risks and the ongoing need to maintain popular support 
highlight the importance of developing an effective communication strategy as part of a 
BBAM program.  
Successful BBAM programs were typically transparent with the public about their goals and 
their progress in meeting those goals. Experts and international organizations have praised 
BBAM programs such as Sweden’s Securum/Retriva, Malaysia’s Danaharta, and South 
Korea’s KAMCO for their transparency and the confidence this instilled in the public. 
Examples of programs that have been criticized for their lack of transparency include 
Indonesia’s IBRA, Nigeria’s AMCON, and Thailand’s TAMC. Appropriate accounting and data 
standards can help improve transparency by ensuring that information is provided in a way 
that can be understood and trusted (EC 2018).  
56
The Journal of Financial Crises Vol. 3 Iss. 2
 
 
For some of the programs we studied, more specific information is available about their 
communications strategy. One key message appears to have been that the removal and 
management of NPAs was necessary for the appropriate functioning of the financial system 
and economy. Perhaps most notably, Thailand’s TAMC featured very prominently in the 
2001 election for prime minister, with the winning candidate campaigning on the message 
that TAMC was necessary to accelerate the country’s economic recovery. Depositor 
protection was a key theme of messaging for the RTC in the United States and the Deposit 
Guarantee Fund in Spain. Given its focus on consumer assets, the United Kingdom Asset 
Resolution (UKAR) in the United Kingdom emphasized the consumer-friendly nature of its 
practices. 
In Indonesia, IBRA’s initial attempt to restrict communications about its activities resulted 
in continued negative market sentiment and considerable criticism of the program by 
detractors who mistakenly believed that IBRA was non-operational. It may also have 
interfered with the work of IBRA officials onsite with targeted banks.  
Ownership Structure 
BBAM programs take on NPAs in crisis conditions, often where no market for such assets 
exists and with the risk of significant further losses. Private participation in the ownership 
of BBAM programs can thus be difficult to secure. There can be additional, affirmative 
reasons for government ownership of BBAM programs. Public ownership of a BBAM 
program may make it more feasible to invest the program with special legal powers. 
Additionally, the absence of private interests may more easily allow for considerations 
beyond maximizing return (although as discussed in the Mandate section, drifting too far 
from a commercial purpose may hinder BBAM efficacy). Whether for some or all of these 
reasons, the vast majority of BBAM programs studied were publicly owned. 
For the minority of programs that involved at least some private ownership, the reasons 
appear to have been largely related to legal and accounting considerations. Ireland’s NAMA 
was 51% privately owned in response to then-current guidance from Eurostat12 that asset 
management companies that were majority privately owned would be kept off the 
government’s balance sheet. Spain’s La Sociedad de Gestión de Activos Procedentes de la 
Reestructuración Bancaria (SAREB) had a 55% private ownership majority for the same 
reason. Slovenia’s BAMC had hoped to adopt a similar approach, but the state-dominated 
nature of the Slovenian banking sector made private participation difficult to secure and 
BAMC ended up being fully publicly owned.13 
 
12 Eurostat is the statistical office of the European Union and “ensures the production of European statistics 
according to established rules and statistical principles.” 
13 This highlighting is not intended as an assertion that private ownership of BBAM vehicles is a promising 
approach. Instead, it represents the view that if private ownership is pursued, it may be difficult to actually 
achieve in a banking system dominated by the state. 
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Despite majority private participation, ownership can be structured so as to leave the state 
with most of the control. NAMA, for instance, was largely government controlled despite the 
51% private ownership stake.14  
The legal considerations surrounding private participation in the ownerships of BBAM 
programs in the European Union are continuing to evolve. It is important to note that 
notwithstanding Eurostat’s guidance, credit rating agencies still considered BBAM program 
debt to be on government balance sheets, which calls into question the usefulness of this 
approach. In any event, the approach has been rendered moot by changes to Eurostat’s 
guidance eliminating the ability to keep BBAM debt off government balance sheets via 
private ownership participation. For a complete discussion of the legal considerations 
surrounding BBAM programs in the EU, see EC 2018. 
Most instances of government-owned BBAM programs involved the creation or repurposing 
of a special entity to acquire and manage the NPAs. A minority of programs omitted this step. 
Under the Uruguayan NPPS, the Central Bank of Uruguay acquired NPAs directly onto its 
balance sheet. In Hungary’s LCPs, the Ministry of Finance acquired NPAs before transferring 
only a portion of them to the Hungarian Investment and Development Bank. In Mongolia, 
policymakers initially contemplated establishing MARA as a separately incorporated public 
enterprise to make it less political before deciding that it should be a government agency 
because they thought giving MARA governmental standing would help promote stability in 
the banking sector. Six years after its establishment, MARA ultimately became a public 
enterprise.15  
Governance/Administration 
A fundamental challenge of BBAM program governance is that programs must be 
institutionally independent given the potential for political pressure, but must also be 
subject to mechanisms for holding them accountable (Cas and Peresa 2016). Governance of 
BBAM programs must thus encompass both the internal workings of programs and their 
external oversight.  
The use of an appropriately structured Boards of Directors to oversee BBAM programs is a 
key element of BBAM program governance (Ingves, Seelig, and He 2004). Important 
considerations include the mix between public and private sector representatives, the 
potential role of international experts, and the independence of directors.  
 
14 This highlighting is not intended as an assertion that private ownership of BBAM vehicles is a promising 
approach. Instead, it represents the view that if private ownership is pursued, mechanisms for retaining 
government control over the vehicle may be an important consideration. For more details on how NAMA 
accomplished this control despite private ownership, please consult the underlying NAMA case study. 
15 Despite representing a change to the program, this feature has not been highlighted in yellow based on our 
determination that the change occurred due to evolving circumstances rather than a belief by policymakers that 
the original design was ineffective.  
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Table 6 below summarizes the approaches to Board composition taken by programs studied. 
Table 6: Board Composition 
BBAM Program Board 
Size  
Details on Board Composition 
Burkina Faso: BRCB — Not disclosed. 
China: Four AMCs —  
The Ministry of Finance controlled the chairmanship of the boards of the 4 
AMCs.  
Colombia: CISA 5 
The board had 3 public sector members from Fogafín and 2 private-sector 
members, with the acting president being the Minister of Finance and Public 
Credit.  
Czechoslovakia: KOB — Not disclosed. 
Finland: Arsenal 6 
The board had 4 public-sector and 2 private-sector members. The public 
representatives were from the Treasury, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of 
Trade and Industry, and the Guarantee Fund, while 1 private-sector 
representative was from a bank and the other from a food/beverage 
packaging company.  
Ghana: NPART 9 
The Board of Trustees included a chairman, representatives from the 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning and the Bank of Ghana, the Chief 
Administrator of the Trust, a chartered accountant from the private sector, a 
lawyer with expertise in corporate law, and 3 other experts. 
Hungary: LCPs — None. 
Hungary: MARK 3 
The board was comprised of external members of the Hungarian central 
bank’s Monetary Council.  
Indonesia: IBRA — 
A senior Ministry of Finance official served as the IBRA head, and the 
Financial Sector Policy Committee (FSPC) and the State-owned Enterprises 
Minister oversaw IBRA. The FSPC was chaired by the Coordinating Minister 
of Economy, and its members included the Ministers of Finance and Trade 
and Industry and the state Ministers of National Planning and State-owned 
Enterprises. IBRA also had an oversight committee, which consisted of 9 
members, including a former Minister of Finance, the chairman of IBRA, and 
representatives from the private sector and the academic world. 
Ireland: NAMA 9 
The board was comprised by the CEO of NAMA, the CEO of the National 
Treasury Management Agency, and 7 officials appointed by the Minister for 
Finance.  
Jamaica: FINSAC 10 
FINSAC’s Board of Directors was appointed by the Minister of Finance. Its 
original board consisted of the BOJ Governor, the BOJ Deputy Governor in 
charge of supervision, the managing directors of FINSAC and FIS, and some 
political appointees from law, labor, and academia. 
Japan: RCC — Not disclosed.  
Kazakhstan: RB — 
The Supervisory Board was chaired by a policymaker of at least “Deputy 
Prime Minister rank” and included members of the Economy and Finance 
Ministries, the central bank, the State Property Committee, and other 




The director reported to the central bank (NBK); the Financial Sector 
Adjustment Credit (FINSAC) committee approved assets slated for transfer to 
DEBRA and oversaw broader financial sector restructuring efforts. This 
committee was chaired by the Prime Minister or his designee and was 
comprised of DEBRA’s director, the Chairmen of the NBK and the State 
Property Fund, and the Ministers of Finance, Economy, Agriculture and 
Justice. 
Malaysia: Danaharta 9 
The board consisted of representatives from both the public and private 
sector, which included a chairman, a managing director (for example, the 
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CEO), 2 federal government officials, 3 individuals from the private sector, 
and 2 international members.  
Mexico: FOBAPROA 9 
Four members were from the Ministry of Finance. Three were from the Bank 
of Mexico. Two were from the CNBV. The chairman was from the Ministry of 
Finance and had the deciding vote.  
Mongolia: MARA — Not disclosed. 
Nigeria; AMCON 10 
AMCON’s Board of Directors, which was approved by the Senate, consisted of 4 
executive directors and 6 non-executive members. The central bank 
nominated all 4 executive directors, including the CEO, and 2 non-executive 
members. The Ministry of Finance nominated 3 non-executive members, 
including the chairman of the board, while the last nominee was nominated by 
the Nigeria Deposit Insurance Company. 
Senegal; SNR — 
The board included representatives from the Finance Ministry, the Justice 
Ministry, the BCEAO, international organizations such as the World Bank or 
USAID, and the chair of the debt recovery committee.  
Slovenia: BAMC/DUTB 7 
There were 4 non-executive directors, appointed by the government, and 3 
executive directors, appointed by the non-executive director. 
South Korea: KAMCO 11 
Members of the Management Supervisory Committee included the managing 
director of KAMCO; representatives from the MOFE, the Ministry of Planning 
and Budgeting, the FSC, and the Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation; the 
deputy governor of the KDB; 2 representatives from the banking industry 
nominated by the chairman of the Korea Federation of Banks; 3 professionals 
recommended by the managing director, including an attorney-at-law, a 
certified public accountant or a certified tax accountant, and a university 
professor or doctorate holder who works for a research institute. 
Spain: DGF 8 
Four directors were from the Bank of Spain, and the Deputy Governor was the 
chair. The other 4 directors were from the banking industry.  
Spain: SAREB 15 
The board included the chairman, the CEO, 5 independent members, and 8 
“proprietary directors” who represent the main shareholders of the company. 
Sweden:  Securum/ 
Retriva 
6 
The chairman was a CEO of a state-owned company; other board members 
included the CEO of Securum, a Ministry of Finance representative, and 3 
independent private-sector representatives.  
Tanzania: LART 5–7 
The President of Tanzania appointed the chairman of this board, and the 
Minister of Finance appointed between 4 and 6 other board members.  
Thailand: TAMC 11 
The Minister of Finance appointed up to 11 board members, including a 
representative from the Thai Bankers’ Association, the Chamber of Commerce, 
and the Federation of Thai Industries.  
United Kingdom: UKAR 9 
UKAR shared a Board of Directors with Northern Rock Asset Management 
(NRAM) and Bradford and Bingley (B&B).  
United States: RTC 5 
Initially, the RTC was established under the oversight of the FDIC with a 
different board of directors. In 1991, the RTC Oversight Board was 
established, which included the Secretary of the Treasury as chairman; the 
Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board; the Secretary of Housing and Urban 
Development; and two private-sector representatives appointed by the 
President. 
Uruguay: CBU — Not disclosed. 
 
Source: Author analysis.  
Certain programs studied were also subject to external oversight bodies, but with mixed 
results. In the United States, for example, the RTC had to appear before Congress 
semiannually to answer questions about its activities, while also submitting audited financial 
statements and regular reports. Congress also mandated that the RTC submit to analysis by 
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the Government Accounting Office (GAO). Early criticism from the GAO resulted in 
substantial changes to certain aspects of the RTC’s operations over time, with the GAO 
ultimately praising the RTC for having made significant improvements in response to its 
oversight (GAO 1995).  
In Jamaica, by contrast, a Commission of Enquiry established by Parliament to oversee 
FINSAC’s debt recoveries failed to even produce a report and was ultimately denied 
additional funding.  
Among the most troubled of the BBAM programs studied from a governance standpoint was 
Indonesia’s IBRA. Despite being nominally independent, IBRA faced repeated instances of 
interference including the termination of its head by President Suharto. IBRA’s activities 
were also marred by allegations of widespread corruption, resulting in lawsuits and even 
criminal charges.  
Size 
The programs studied did not generally adopt specific limitations on the amount of NPAs 
that could be acquired, although often they were established with some expectation for what 
the size would ultimately be. Those programs that did specifically restrict size did so 
indirectly, through caps on the amount of debt that could be issued in support of the 
programs’ operations. Like many BBAM programs, Ireland’s NAMA acquired NPAs in 
exchange for debt securities, but it was limited to issuing up to €54 billion in such securities 
before needing to seek further authorization from the government. Slovenia’s BAMC 
similarly acquired NPAs in exchange for debt securities, with a €4 billion cap on such 
issuances.  
BBAM programs must generally seek the middle-ground approach of being neither too small 
nor too large given their specific contexts. A program that is too small may fail to adequately 
address the banking system’s NPA problem or to justify the effort and expense of a 
centralized solution. A program that is too large imposes a number of challenges, including 
increased operational difficulties and heightened risk to the taxpayer for programs that are 
publicly funded. As further discussed in the Eligible Assets section, although Malaysia’s 
Danaharta did not set an explicit program size, it determined an amount of NPAs that it 
thought was manageable and then established asset size thresholds based on an analysis of 
how many NPAs it would end up acquiring based on those thresholds.  
Funding Source 
Consistent with the fact that the majority of BBAM programs studied were fully publicly 
owned, most of the programs studied were also fully publicly funded. This public funding 
could come directly from the taxpayer, be raised with the issuance of government bonds, 
take the form of government-guaranteed bonds issued to the transferring institutions as 
consideration, or be paid for by the central bank (sometimes with the government later 
taking on the central bank’s obligations). However, even some publicly owned programs 
incorporated features intended to share losses with private parties. Funding programs 
through assessments on participating banks or the financial system more broadly might 
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provide important political and communication leverage because those viewed as 
responsible for the problem are seen as having to pay for addressing it, but this must be 
weighed against the risks associated with placing an additional financial burden on the very 
institutions that are weak and in need of rescue.   
Ireland’s NAMA, in addition to being majority privately owned, included several mechanisms 
for sharing losses. If NAMA ended up sustaining losses in the aggregate, it had the ability to 
tax participants to be made whole. The consideration NAMA paid for acquired assets was 
also 5% comprised of subordinated debt issued by NAMA and tied to its financial 
performance (with the remaining 95% in government-guaranteed bonds). Several programs 
sought to relieve the financial burden on the government over time through broad, ongoing 
assessments on the financial sector. Nigeria established a Banking Sector Resolution Cost 
Fund (RCF) alongside publicly owned AMCON to absorb the losses on acquired NPAs. The 
RCF was funded over a 10-year period with contributions from the Central Bank of Nigeria 
(33% of RCF funding) and from annual 30-to-50-basis-point assessments on the assets of all 
institutions eligible for AMCON (67% of RCF funding). Mexico funded publicly owned 
FOBAPROA with 30-to-70-basis-point assessments on the liabilities of banks. Spain funded 
the publicly owned Deposit Guarantee Fund with equal contributions from the Bank of Spain 
and the Spanish banking sector, with banks subject to a 10-to-30-basis-point assessment on 
deposits. Such efforts were not always enough to prevent further losses to the taxpayer. The 
RCF, for example, proved insufficient to ultimately cover all of the losses associated with 
Nigeria’s combined BBAM and recapitalization initiative.  
And as will be discussed in more detail in the section on Pricing, multiple programs studied 
contained ex post purchase price adjustments intended to minimize losses in the first place. 
Inadequate and/or uncertain funding can undermine BBAM programs by interfering with 
their ability to conduct operations and reducing their willingness to dispose of assets that 
will impose additional losses. The need to go back for additional funding may also increase 
the risk of a loss of political independence. Analysts have cited funding problems as 
undermining effectiveness in evaluations of programs including the United States’ RTC (FDIC 
1998) and Mexico’s FOBAPROA (Klingebiel 2000). Hungary’s proposal to temporarily fund 
asset purchases with bridge loans from the Hungarian central bank violated the European 
Central Bank’s prohibition on monetary financing and prevented Hungary’s MARK from 
conducting operations.  
Eligible Institutions 
As illustrated in Table 1 in the Overview, the programs studied include a mix of open-bank 
programs, closed-bank programs, and programs for both open banks and closed banks. This 
determination would typically follow from a diagnosis of the situation through a stress test, 
asset quality review, or some other method. Having ascertained if there are banks needing 
to be liquidated, banks needing support, or some combination of both, policymakers can 
determine if a BBAM program is appropriate and, if so, define eligibility accordingly.  
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Programs were generally available to banks in the relevant jurisdiction (or to failed banks in 
the case of closed-bank programs), with some exceptions. Even some open-bank programs 
limited participation to institutions that met certain criteria for distress, including falling 
below required capital adequacy ratios (as was the case with the bank-oriented component 
of Hungary’s LCPs) or failing stress tests (as was the case with Spain’s SAREB). Other open-
bank programs, such as BAMC in Slovenia and China’s 1999 AMC program, targeted the 
largest financial institutions in the country.  
Whether or not participating institutions are state-owned can be an important 
consideration, with implications for other design features, such as the valuation of the 
acquired assets as discussed in Pricing. Given the widespread use of BBAM programs in 
countries transitioning away from state-controlled financial systems, several programs 
studied involved significant participation by state-owned banks. In Tanzania, LART initially 
limited participation to state-owned institutions, before expanding eligibility to private 
institutions after the program was underway.16 
Nonbank financial institutions were included in a minority of programs studied. South 
Korea’s KAMCO allowed nonbank financial institutions, including investment trust 
companies, insurance companies, and securities firms, to participate, although it ended up 
acquiring most assets from banks. The definition of eligible financial institutions under 
Japan’s Resolution and Collection Corporation (RCC) encompassed certain specialized 
institutions, such as agricultural and fishery cooperatives. Thailand’s TAMC included state-
owned and private AMCs because the country initially attempted a decentralized approach 
to dealing with its NPA problem before deciding that a centralized AMC was necessary. 
A key consideration in defining eligible institutions is whether to make participation in a 
BBAM program mandatory or voluntary. For the programs studied that involved a closed-
bank component, participation was generally automatic upon an institution’s reaching a 
given state of failure. For open-bank programs, participation was sometimes mandatory for 
institutions meeting certain requirements. 
For voluntary programs, the price paid for acquired NPAs is obviously a primary driver of 
participation as is discussed in Pricing. Among the programs studied, policymakers 
sometimes also included incentives for participation. One common incentive was requiring 
banks seeking to take advantage of the concurrent recapitalization program to participate in 
the BBAM program. This was the case for Malaysia’s Danaharta, which also had a multi-
faceted “carrot and stick” approach to encourage eligible institutions to participate. In 
addition to a profit-sharing system discussed in more detail in Pricing, Danaharta allowed 
institutions transferring NPAs to amortize the losses over a five-year period. Conversely, any 
NPAs not transferred had to be written down immediately. Institutions also had only one 
opportunity to transfer a given NPA. Additional tools used in other programs studied include 
 
16 Despite representing a change to the program, this feature has not been highlighted in yellow based on our 
determination that the change occurred due to evolving circumstances rather than a belief by policymakers that 
the original design was ineffective.  
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capital surcharges on targeted assets remaining on bank balance sheets (Hungary’s MARK) 
and caps on NPA levels (Nigeria’s AMCON). 
Some programs approached eligibility by targeting debtors rather than creditors. In addition 
to a bank-oriented component that took the traditional approach of acquiring NPAs from 
targeted banks, Hungary’s LCPs had a firm-oriented component that acquired NPAs made to 
select “strategic” state-owned enterprises regardless of the originating bank. Kazakhstan’s 
Rehabilitation Bank focused on the country’s largest delinquent debtors.  
Eligible Assets 
As noted in the Background section, the types of eligible assets can determine the success of 
a program, with certain types of assets being particularly ill advised. The assets eligible to be 
included must thus be defined with particular care. Among the asset types that may be a poor 
fit for BBAM programs are: 
• Loans to state-owned enterprises or other politically connected debtors, which can 
increase the likelihood of government interference, as was the case in several 
programs studied including IBRA in Indonesia, Société Nationale de Recouvrement 
(SNR) in Senegal, and FOBAPROA in Mexico. 
• Residential mortgages, which can also be politically sensitive, as was the case in 
Jamaica’s FINSAC. 
• Consumer loans and loans to small- and medium-sized enterprises, which may 
require too much direct knowledge of the debtors.  
Assets typically better suited to BBAM programs include commercial real estate and large 
corporate exposures, which are generally larger in size, less politically fraught, and backed 
by collateral that is easier to realize upon.  
Additional complications can arise if the assets acquired are too heterogeneous or include 
too many small exposures to be effectively managed. Finland’s Arsenal accepted NPAs of all 
types and sizes, a fact that evaluations of the program have cited as hindering its efforts to 
dispose of assets (Klingebiel 2000). To address the concern about the efficiency of handling 
small assets, several programs studied included minimum asset size requirements including 
Securum/Retriva in Sweden, Danaharta in Malaysia, and SAREB in Spain. In Malaysia, 
policymakers established the minimum size threshold at the point at which they thought 
they could manage the workload, having analyzed what loans that meant they would be 
buying. 
Certain programs studied went beyond simply excluding small exposures and specifically 
targeted NPAs from the most significant delinquent debtors in the country. This was the 
approach taken by Kazakhstan’s Rehabilitation Bank and the firm-oriented component of 
Hungary’s LCPs. The ability to aggregate the debt of such large debtors and thereby increase 
negotiating power is one potential benefit of a BBAM approach.  
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One of the potential concerns associated with BBAM programs is the risk of moral hazard. If 
banks have an expectation that they will be able to transfer NPAs to a BBAM program, they 
may be more likely to extend risky loans. Several programs studied sought to address moral 
hazard by limiting eligibility to assets initiated by a given date. China’s 1999 AMC program 
accepted only NPAs generated by policy lending prior to 1996. The bank-oriented 
component of Hungary’s 1992 LCPs excluded loans made after October 1, 1992. Tanzania’s 
LART initially restricted eligibility to assets in existence at the time of the legislation 
establishing the program. 
The risk associated with being too restrictive in the assets accepted by a BBAM program is 
that it may leave banks with NPA levels that remain problematically high. This appears to 
have been the case with Thailand’s TAMC, in which different sets of asset eligibility criteria 
were developed for state-owned institutions and for private institutions. The criteria for 
private institutions were more stringent, with NPAs subject to a previous court ruling or 
restructuring agreements deemed ineligible. Given that Thailand had already been in crisis 
for several years by the time of the TAMC’s introduction, this excluded a majority of NPAs 
held by private institutions. As a result, the TAMC acquired the vast majority of its assets 
from state-owned institutions, while private banks and AMCs retained high levels of NPAs. 
While the nature of BBAM programs is such that they typically acquired NPAs specifically, 
many programs, such as the RTC in the United States, the RCC in Japan, and the BAMC in 
Slovenia, also acquired performing loans. This may have been motivated by the belief that 
consolidating all of the obligations of a given debtor, whether performing or not, would give 
the BBAM program additional leverage and promote more effective restructuring. This was 
the motivation explicitly cited by the BAMC. It may also be intended to help the BBAM 
program achieve stand-alone profitability. However, there may be circumstances in which 
specific performing assets are included for political reasons. Nigeria’s AMCON purchased 
performing loans that it deemed too large relative to the capital base of the transferring 
banks, but critics allege that these assets were included because a government official was 
the debtor (Cerutti and Neyens 2016).  
Acquisition Mechanics 
Policymakers designing BBAM programs must determine the mechanics of acquiring the 
targeted assets. The approaches here are generally very different for closed-bank programs 
and open-bank programs. Closed-bank programs typically acquire assets automatically upon 
an institution’s failure, often with no need to make decisions about which specific assets to 
acquire and what consideration to provide. In some instances, negotiation over which NPAs 
a closed-bank program would take on were a key feature of attempts to sell failed banks to 
acquiring institutions, as was the case for the United States’ RTC and the Spain’s Deposit 
Guarantee Fund.  
Open-bank programs, conversely, must choose which NPAs to acquire, as well as the timing, 
logistics, and consideration to be used. In many cases, participating institutions provided 
BBAM programs with lists of eligible assets that the programs would then evaluate for 
acquisition. In Hungary, MARK selected the specific assets to be acquired at random off a list 
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of all eligible assets to avoid adverse selection and help ensure that assets were acquired at 
an appropriate price.17  
The timing of asset acquisition by open-bank BBAM programs can create moral hazard 
concerns. Ongoing asset purchases may encourage banks to engage in risky lending with the 
expectation that any NPAs that result can be transferred to the program. For programs that 
want or need to make ongoing purchases, this can be addressed by limiting the assets that 
can be transferred to those existing as of a certain date, as discussed in Eligible Assets. 
Several programs did in fact employ a tranche approach, in which assets were purchased in 
groups over time, in most cases seemingly to avoid the logistical difficulties that would have 
been associated with attempting to acquire all targeted NPAs at once. Malaysia’s Danaharta 
acquired NPAs in two rounds—an initial primary carveout and a secondary carveout with 
more selective criteria. Thailand’s TAMC sorted NPAs into tranches based on the number of 
creditors, institution type, and amount of outstanding debt. Slovenia’s BAMC divided 
purchases among multiple tranches, with all of the assets associated with a given debtor 
included in the same tranche. Spain used the health of the transferring financial institutions 
to split SAREB’s acquisition into two groups, with the most distressed institutions 
transferring first. In Ireland, NAMA had to abandon its initial plan of sorting assets into 
tranches where the first tranche contained a small number of debtors with large exposures 
and later tranches would include more debtors with smaller exposures. This multi-step 
process was proving to be too slow. The need to accelerate the pace of asset acquisition 
resulted in the collapsing of multiple anticipated future tranches into one final bulk tranche.  
The consideration paid for acquired NPAs in open-bank programs typically consisted of debt 
securities, often guaranteed by the government. The use of debt securities avoids the need 
to provide cash up front and instead allows for payment over time as the program begins to 
realize returns on acquired NPAs. This is a concern primarily for budget-constrained 
governments that would otherwise not have the ability to fund the purchases. In such 
situations, bond maturity should be tied to the lifespan of the program and the expected 
timing of cash flows from the NPAs (Ingves, Seelig, and He 2004). Another approach is to use 
zero-coupon bonds to delay the need to make any payments until bond maturity, as was done 
in Nigeria’s AMCON. If the bonds are eligible collateral for central bank lending facilities, they 
can also be used to improve recipient banks’ liquidity position right away. A less common 
form of consideration seen in Kazakhstan’s Rehabilitation Bank and Senegal’s SNR was the 
removal of NPAs from bank balance sheets in exchange for the cancellation of a 
corresponding amount of bank liabilities owed to the government. These liabilities could 
 
17 While the random selection of assets off a submitted list to reduce adverse selection was a key feature highlighted 
by the European Commission in its consideration of Hungary’s MARK, the ability of random selection to effectively 
combat adverse selection is dependent on the submitted list itself not being the product of adverse selection. 
Randomly selecting assets off a list of an institution’s worst NPAs would still leave a BBAM program with the worst 
NPAs. Such a design feature is thus interesting, but also to be approached with caution.  
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take the form of previous government assistance and/or deposits from state-owned 
enterprises or other agencies of the government.18  
Acquisition Pricing 
A key consideration for the design of a BBAM program, particularly one that will engage in 
open-bank acquisitions, is the price at which assets will be acquired. Cerruti and Neyens 
(2016) have described this as the most difficult of all of the design decisions associated with 
establishing a BBAM program. As discussed throughout this survey, it is also a decision that 
has significant implications for other program features. 
As illustrated in Table 7, approaches to pricing can generally be divided into one of three 
categories: acquisition at book value, acquisition at real economic value, or acquisition at 
market price. In crisis conditions, it is generally understood that acquisitions at both book 
value and market price are likely to result in pricing that is different from the actual value of 
the asset. If an NPA is acquired at book value, the price will be higher than the asset’s ultimate 
return, given its nonperforming status. This shifts the losses associated with the NPA from 
the transferring institutions to the BBAM program. If an NPA is acquired at market price, the 
price will be lower than the asset’s ultimate return, given the market-distorting effect of the 
crisis. 
 
18 The ability to net the purchase price for transferred assets against amounts already owed by the transferring 
institutions to the state may be a way of simplifying the process of acquiring assets in some circumstances.  
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Table 7: Approaches to Pricing 
 
 
Source: Author analysis. 
Both paying too much and paying too little for NPAs have the potential to undermine the 
effectiveness of BBAM programs. Paying too much may obviate the need for recapitalizing 
the transferring banks as discussed in the Part of a Package section, but there are potential 
concerns associated with this form of indirect recapitalization. These include (1) the fact that 
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capital provided in this form is free or low cost and therefore disadvantages other firms and 
(2) the fact that direct injections typically afford policymakers more control over the 
institutions receiving the capital (Rose 2005). Paying too much may also undermine 
attempts to deal with the NPAs themselves. If BBAM programs acquire NPAs at prices above 
what can be realized from the assets, the disposal of the NPAs will result in large, immediate 
losses. The desire to avoid such an outcome may result in BBAM programs’ holding on to 
NPAs without any real effort to dispose of them. If acquiring NPAs at higher values is 
necessary despite this concern, an immediate revaluation on the books of the BBAM program 
may be important in removing any disincentive to disposal (Rose 2005). 
As indicated in Table 7, acquisition at book value has been a frequently used approach, 
notwithstanding the concerns associated with paying too much for NPAs. Sometimes this 
may be a practical consideration. The Spanish Deposit Guarantee Fund, for example, 
purchased NPAs at book value because policymakers considered it too difficult to determine 
an alternate, market-based price. It is also the case that book value pricing may be less of a 
concern where the participants in a BBAM program are state-owned banks, because the state 
will be responsible for the losses whether they are imposed on the program or on the 
transferring banks. 
Paying too little for NPAs introduces its own set of potential challenges. If institutions 
perceive the price offered for NPAs as too low and participation is voluntary, there may be 
little uptake. This was initially the case for the RCC in Japan, which in its early years paid an 
average of 3.8% of book value and attracted few participants. Japanese policymakers later 
successfully amended the RCC’s approach with the explicit objective of encouraging more 
participation. Prices can be too low to secure participation not only in absolute terms, but 
also relative to institutions’ expectations about what prices will be available in future 
versions of the BBAM program. Hungary’s LCPs featured both an initial bank-oriented 
component that acquired NPAs from targeted banks and a subsequent firm-oriented 
component that acquired NPAs made to targeted state-owned enterprises by any banks. It 
appears that banks were reluctant to dispose of eligible NPAs during the initial bank-
oriented component because they expected those same NPAs to fetch higher prices during 
the subsequent firm-oriented component.  
Even if BBAM programs succeed in attracting participants at low prices (possibly because 
participation is mandatory), such pricing can interfere with the effective disposition of 
acquired NPAs. A BBAM program that acquires NPAs at very low prices may be able to 
achieve significant profits without maximizing the value of those assets. This could reduce 
incentives for maximizing value and promote hurried disposal at prices below those that 
might ultimately be possible. 
The real economic value approach to pricing can be seen as an attempt to find the 
appropriate middle path between prices that are too high and prices that are too low for a 
BBAM program to be successful. Typically it involves an attempt to determine the intrinsic 
value of an asset outside of crisis conditions when the market-distorting effects of the crisis 
have subsided and the actual losses incurred by the asset are realized. This can prove 
difficult, as was the case with Spain’s SAREB, where a revaluation of assets three years after 
69
Broad-Based Asset Management Programs McNamara et al.
 
 
they had been acquired at what was then considered real economic value resulted in 
substantial losses.  
For BBAM programs introduced in the European Union, purchasing assets at an above-
market price constituted State aid under EC rules. Such purchases would be approved only 
if they met certain criteria set forth in the Communication from the Commission on the 
Treatment of Impaired Assets in the Community Banking Sector of February 25, 2009 (better 
known as the Impaired Asset Communication, or IAC) and subsequently modified in future 
communications. To comply with these criteria, programs generally needed to purchase 
assets at their “real economic value,” a figure aiming to approximate the asset’s long-term 
economic value based on prudent assumptions about cash flows and observable market 
inputs. This resulted in lengthy valuation processes and/or clashes with the European 
Commission that often delayed BBAM programs in the EU. For a more detailed discussion of 
the European Commission’s approach to pricing, see EC 2018.  
Given the uncertainty and complexity associated with attempting to value assets in the midst 
of crisis and often with little time to do so, some BBAM programs relied on ex post purchase 
price adjustments based on how the NPAs ultimately performed. These could be structured 
to protect the BBAM program from losses resulting from overpaying, to protect the 
transferring banks from losses resulting from underpaying, or both. Sometimes these ex post 
adjustments were done only temporarily given the need to acquire an initial set of assets 
with considerable speed. This was the case with South Korea’s KAMCO, which aimed to make 
rapid initial bulk purchases, leaving inadequate time to completely evaluate assets. The AMC 
consequently included mechanisms for ex post price adjustments. Once market conditions 
stabilized, KAMCO shifted its approach to rely on more exact upfront pricing with no 
adjustments.19  
Other adjustments were more permanent. Perhaps the most extreme adjustment example 
was Indonesia’s IBRA, under which banks received no upfront consideration for the 
transferred NPAs but were entitled to any proceeds from their ultimate disposition. In 
Ireland, NAMA set an initial price for assets based on calculations of real economic value, but 
this amount was subject to a clawback feature that enabled NAMA to recover any amount it 
was determined to have overpaid on acquired assets stemming from expedited and/or 
inaccurate initial valuations. NAMA could also include a clawback feature to protect banks 
from underpayment, but it is unclear how widely used this was. Danaharta in Malaysia 
included a profit-sharing arrangement as an incentive for participation, whereby 
transferring institutions were entitled to 80% of the profits on NPA disposal. Conversely, 
Mexico’s FOBAPROA negotiated loss-sharing arrangements with participating banks that 
would leave banks responsible for 20 to 30% of the losses on the NPAs that they transferred. 
 
19 Despite representing a change to the program, this feature has not been highlighted in yellow based on our 
determination that the change occurred due to evolving circumstances rather than a belief by policymakers that 
the original design was ineffective. In a situation in which initial large-scale asset purchases must be done quickly 
without adequate time for valuation, it may be worth considering making the use of purchase price adjustments 
temporary and transitioning to full valuation with no adjustments as soon as conditions allow.   
70
The Journal of Financial Crises Vol. 3 Iss. 2
 
 
Under Thailand’s TAMC, transferring institutions shared in profits up to the book value of 
transferred assets and were responsible for losses of up to 30% of the transferring price. The 
TAMC and the transferring institutions calculated and recognized these profits and losses at 
the end of the fifth and 10th years of the TAMC’s operations.  
While potentially attractive in terms of their ability to promote accurate pricing and protect 
BBAM programs from losses, adjustments may hinder the effective functioning of the 
intervention. Banks may be less willing to transfer NPAs if they remain exposed to further 
losses on them (Ingves, Seelig, and He 2004). And even if banks do transfer the NPAs, this 
continued exposure could mean that counterparties remain uncertain about the banks’ 
viability. Particularly where a BBAM program is intended to restore counterparty confidence 
in institutions to, for example, ensure their continued access to funding, ex post price 
adjustments may be counterproductive. 
Management and Disposal 
The approaches taken to the management and disposal of acquired NPAs in programs 
studied were closely related to their overarching mandates. An overview of select programs’ 
approaches is included in Table 8. 
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Table 8: Approaches to Management and Disposal 
 
 
Source: Author analysis. 
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A minority approach to the management and disposal of NPAs gave responsibility for the 
assets to the transferring institutions, either because the institutions were better positioned 
to deal with them and/or because the exposures were too small to warrant the attention of 
BBAM program staff. Where a primary objective of a BBAM program is to free transferring 
banks to focus on their core business, requiring these banks to remain responsible for the 
management and disposition of the assets can be self-defeating. Such arrangements also 
require careful consideration of the banks’ incentives and contractual provisions that reflect 
these realities. Hungary’s LCPs adopted this approach for the bank-oriented component of 
its program. Mexico’s FOBAPROA also made use of the banks themselves, and as discussed 
in the Pricing section, negotiated loss-sharing arrangements to incentivize banks to manage 
assets appropriately. In Spain, SAREB initially relied on transferring banks for management 
and disposal before concerns about conflicts of interest ultimately prompted a shift to 
outside contractors. 
The use of outside contractors or the sale of NPAs to third parties who will then seek to 
collect on them can create political challenges. In Jamaica, FINSAC transferred residual NPAs 
to an American financial institution whose aggressive collection efforts resulted in 
widespread criticism from the Jamaican public.  
In some instances, attempts to build safeguards into the disposal process interfered with 
program effectiveness. Congress initially required the United States’ RTC to dispose of assets 
for at least 95% of assessed value. They later reduced this threshold to 70% to accelerate the 
disposition process. In Slovenia, the BAMC was subject to a requirement that it dispose of at 
least 10% of its assets every year, but this may have resulted in forced sales and unnecessary 
losses.  
The need to dispose of large volumes of NPAs often resulted in the pioneering of new 
techniques and products. The United States’ RTC is often credited with having jumpstarted 
the market for commercial mortgage securitizations. Danaharta was responsible for the first 
collateralized loan obligation in Malaysia. The desire to develop secondary markets for NPAs 
and new approaches for dealing with them was often a key consideration in launching BBAM 
programs. 
Timeframe 
A final key consideration in the design of BBAM programs is whether or not the program 
should have a predefined timeframe and, if so, how long it should be. Too short a timeframe 
could result in a program’s disposing of NPAs prematurely in ways that exacerbate market 
conditions and/or fail to maximize the value of the assets. Too long a timeframe could result 
in NPAs’ languishing in the program and continuing to lose value over time. 
As Table 9 illustrates, the programs studied took a variety of approaches to the timeframe 
question. Given the potential concern that too long a timeframe could result in languishing, 
it is perhaps surprising to see how many programs had no predefined timeframes and were 
effectively open ended. The IMF repeatedly criticized Nigeria’s AMCON, for example, for 
failure to establish a sunset date, warning that it increased financial risks and the threat of 
moral hazard (IMF 2013). Instead of relying on open-ended timeframes, several programs 
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studied appear to have addressed timing uncertainty by establishing a defined lifespan 
subject to extension. As indicated in Table 9, several countries made use of such extensions, 
while others ended programs early.  
Table 9: Approaches to Timeframe 
 
 
Source: Author analysis. 
III. Evaluation 
A small body of literature has examined BBAM programs to determine which are generally 
seen as successful, which are generally seen as unsuccessful, and what shared characteristics 
may account for their relative performance. A 2016 World Bank study (Cerutti and Neyens) 
compared nine centralized AMCs from the 1980s through the Global Financial Crisis and, as 
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outlined in Table 10, identified non-exhaustive “good practices” for AMC management. A 
2020 IMF report (Dobler, Moretti, and Piris) provided lessons learned from the 
organization’s official response to systemic banking crises across the world and came up 
with a similar list of design features of successful centralized AMCs. A 2017 Financial 
Stability Institute report (Baudino and Yun) described various options for addressing 
systemic NPA problems and the situations in which centralized AMCs might be necessary 
and most likely to succeed. In 2018, based on the recent experience of Ireland and other EU 
countries with centralized AMCs, the European Commission published an “AMC Blueprint” 
with wide-ranging recommendations for EU countries considering establishing AMCs in the 
future (EC).  
These studies identified many of the same context factors and design decisions that our 
survey has shown to be particularly influential in determining program success. Programs 
whose NPAs involve commercial real estate or large corporate exposures are generally more 
successful than programs whose NPAs comprise loans to politically connected debtors, 
residential mortgages, consumer loans, or SME loans. Programs in countries with strong 
legal systems are generally more successful than programs in countries with weak legal 
systems in which creditors cannot effectively enforce their rights. Programs with strong 
governance and good transparency are generally more successful than programs without. 
Yet, despite the frequency with which they have been used, dating back to as early as the 
1980s, BBAM programs have not been the subject of many empirical studies that seek to 
demonstrate whether or not they worked and, if so, what design features promote program 
success (Brei et al. 2020). This may stem in part from the challenges associated with 
evaluating BBAM programs. As discussed in Part of a Package, BBAM programs are often 
combined with other interventions such that it can be difficult to disentangle the effects of 
different parts of a combined package. BBAM programs are also highly context specific. Two 
similar programs may produce very different outcomes based on the nature and extent of 
the problem NPAs and the speed of the economic recovery. There is also the question of what 
it even means for a given BBAM program to be a success in light of the various objectives 
policymakers may have had in introducing it. The political and legal climate matters. A BBAM 
program may succeed at cleaning up balance sheets and spurring lending, but at a fiscal cost 
that taxpayers deem unacceptable. 
So how to measure success? The World Bank study (Cerutti and Neyens 2016) noted that 
BBAM assessment traditionally focused on recovery rates on impaired assets, but it is now 
more likely to consider a program’s holistic contribution to resolving a crisis, taking into 
account its ability to repay its own debt and limit taxpayers’ losses. The study presented 
high-level statistics measuring these factors for the nine programs it examined.  
In one of the few empirical studies of a much larger dataset, Brei et. al. (2020) analyzed BBAM 
programs’ success at cleaning up bank balance sheets and encouraging continued lending, 
reflecting mandates common to all BBAM programs. Brei et. al. used a dataset of 135 banks 
from 15 European banking systems during the period from 2000 to 2016 that benefited from 
“asset segregation” initiatives. Brei et. al. defined asset segregation broadly to include both 
centralized BBAM programs and decentralized AMCs. Brei et. al. find that asset segregation 
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without recapitalization has a statistically insignificant impact on future NPA levels and loan 
growth. Recapitalization-only approaches, in turn, improved NPA levels but not loan growth, 
as banks use injected funds to clean up balance sheets rather than extend new lending. Thus, 
neither tool is effective on its own in reducing future NPAs and promoting lending. Instead, 
they must be used together to achieve lower NPA levels and boost credit growth. Brei et. al. 
also find that asset segregation is more effective when it (1) is privately funded20, (2) 
involves smaller shares of originating banks’ assets, and (3) occurs in countries with strong 
legal systems.  
The effective use of BBAM programs by policymakers requires a thorough analysis of the 
specific context they face and, if a BBAM program is indicated, the careful development of a 
program designed to maximize effectiveness. 
 
20 As noted, historically, most BBAM programs have been publicly funded. Given that Brei et. al. (2020) include 
both decentralized AMCs and BBAM programs in their study, it could be that the effectiveness of private funding 
is a relevant conclusion only for the former. 
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Table 10: Good Practices for BBAM Programs 
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